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Clarity enables compliance. Ambiguity drives overcompliance.

FDA’s cybersecurity guidance for medical devices is strong on principle and fuzzy on threshold. That gap does not reduce burden. It moves the interpretation downstream, and companies overbuild to defend themselves.

3 min read

I have been spending time with FDA’s cybersecurity guidance, and there is a gap in what FDA is asking for.

This is one of the most comprehensive frameworks FDA has produced. Clear intent. Strong principles. Directionally aligned with where risk actually lives today.

But the expectations are a bit fuzzy.

The guidance states that approaches should be risk-based, scalable, and that alternative approaches are acceptable. Then you reach the recommended documentation table and the full expectation stack is laid out: SBOMs, threat modelling, fuzz testing, penetration testing, security risk management documentation, ongoing vulnerability tracking and patch documentation across the total product lifecycle.

In practice, that table becomes the floor. Companies are going to follow it.

For cyber devices, some of this is no longer just expectation. It is required by law under Section 524B of the FD&C Act, which requires manufacturers to have processes for monitoring, identifying and addressing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities. That shifts this into obligation.

So companies respond the way they always do under regulatory uncertainty. They overbuild. Not because they misunderstand risk, but because the cost of under-delivering is a deficiency they cannot easily defend, especially during inspections.

Three pressure points

Scope

FDA says to consider “related systems”, including update mechanisms and external connections. That makes sense. But where does responsibility stop? If a hospital network your device connects to is compromised, is that on you or the hospital? The boundary is not clearly defined.

Thresholds

The guidance says scale based on risk, but does not define what is enough. FDA uses a non-connected thermometer as a low-risk example. Most devices are far more complex. So the question becomes: how much testing and documentation is enough for everything in between? There is no clear answer, so companies default to doing more, and producing more paperwork.

Vioela’s note: One detail in the guidance changes how the whole risk assessment has to be done, and teams trained on safety risk management miss it. Security risk is not scored on probability. Nobody can estimate how likely an attack is from historical data, so FDA asks you to assess exploitability instead: how easy is it to take advantage of the weakness? A risk file that multiplies severity by likelihood, the way a safety file does, is answering a question the reviewer did not ask.

Control versus responsibility

You are expected to manage risks from third-party software even when you do not control it. If a software library you use has a vulnerability, you are still responsible for tracking and addressing the risk, even if you cannot fix the code yourself.

You can outsource the work. You cannot outsource the responsibility. You can say “the supplier is responsible for vulnerabilities”, and that works between you and the supplier.

FDA does not care about your contract. FDA looks at who is putting the device on the market.

Vioela’s note: Two things that surprise first-time submitters. Since October 2023, FDA can refuse to accept a submission for a cyber device that lacks the required cybersecurity information, so a thin package does not get a slow review. It gets no review. And the software bill of materials is expected to be machine readable and kept current after launch. Treat it as a living inventory, because on the day a vulnerability is announced in a common library, the first question is whether you can tell within hours which of your products contain it.

Why this matters

None of this makes the direction wrong. But when interpretation sits downstream with companies, reviewers and inspectors, consistency becomes difficult. What you get instead is variability.

And variability is where friction lives.

Clarity enables compliance. Ambiguity drives overcompliance. Over time, overcompliance becomes its own risk.

Adapted from a post first published on LinkedIn.